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I EVIDENCE CORNER
Daubert, or not Daubert? That is the question
on expert testimony in Montana state courts
By Cynthia Ford
DNA evidence is regularly admitted
in court, both in real life and on TV.
Psychic evidence is not. Trial judges are
required to police the border between
"good enough" and "junk/woo-woo"
science, but that border is sinuous and
ever-changing as knowledge evolves.
What standard must judges, lawyers
and litigants apply in disputes over the
admissibility of expert testimony in
Montana state cases?
In federal court cases, the answer to
the title question is easy: the Daubert'
standard for expert2 testimony applies
in all federal cases. However, unless
there is a constitutional component, the
Federal Rules of Evidence and federal
cases construing them are only per-
suasive in Montana state courts. The
Montana Supreme Court is our binding
authority, and, like many other states,
we have diverged from the U.S. Supreme
Court and recent amendments to FRE
702 regarding expert testimony. As a re-
sult, in Montana, the answer to the ques-
tion is "it depends." Montana judges are
required to apply the Daubert analysis
only for testimony based on "novel"
scientific methods. In most cases, where
the specialized field is "non-novel," the
state court is not required to apply the
Daubert est, but still must apply a tra-
ditional Rule 702 analysis for challenged
expert testimony.
In this article, I will do a brief re-
fresher on the Daubert standard, and
then discuss the Montana line between
"novel" and "non-novel" expert testi-
mony. In the next Evidence Corner
column, I will examine in more detail
the application of MRE 702 when the
area in question is non-novel, as most
are. Finally, in a third column, I will
delve into the most recent Montana
cases about whether a particular witness
was sufficiently qualified to give expert
testimony.
Daubert standard in federal court
The Federal Rules of Evidence were
adopted in 1973 and became effec-
tive in 1975. They included Rule 702,
governing the admissibility of expert
testimony (see below for a comparison
of the history and current texts of the
federal and Montana versions of Rule
702). Before the FRE became effec-
tive, and after that date until 1993, the
federal courts assessed the admissibility
of expert testimony per the "Frye3 test:"
was the methodology used by the expert
"generally accepted" in the relevant field?
However, in 1993, the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Daubert v.
Dow Chemical4 held that Frye had been
supplanted by the adoption of FRE 702,
and that general acceptance was only
one, but not the sole, factor to consid-
er in determining the reliability of the
methodology used by the expert:
In the 70 years since its formulation in
the Frye case, the "general acceptance"
test has been the dominant standard
for determining the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence at trial.
Although under increasing attack of
late, the rule continues to be followed
by a majority of courts, including the
Ninth Circuit.
The Frye test has its origin in a short
and citation-free 1923 decision...
The merits of the Frye test have been
much debated, and scholarship on
its proper scope and application is
legion. Petitioners' primary attack,
however, is not on the content but on
the continuing authority of the rule.
They contend that the Frye test was
superseded by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. We agree.
(Citations and footnotes omitted).
509 U.S. at 585. Note that there was
no issue in Daubert about the qualifica-
tions of the plaintiffs experts; even the
Supreme Court noted that all of them
were experts in their fields. Rather, the
issue was whether the novel techniques
the experts had applied were sufficiently
reliable to allow the admission of their
opinions thus derived.
Although it rejected "general accep-
tance" as the tool for doing so, Daubert
continued to require that judges patrol
the border between admissible and inad-
missible expert testimony:
That the Frye test was displaced
by the Rules of Evidence does not
mean, however, that the Rules
themselves place no limits on
the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such
evidence. To the contrary, under the
Rules the trial judge must ensure
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that any and all scientific testimony
or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable.
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added).
509 U.S. at 589. The Court (which
does not itself have to make these diffi-
cult decisions on the field) then supplied
some guidelines for how to do so:
Faced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether
the expert is proposing to testify to
(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue. This entails a
preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue. We are
confident that federal judges possess
the capacity to undertake this review.
Many factors will bear on the inquiry,
and we do not presume to set out a
definitive checklist or test.
509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court
then laid out a list of non-exhaustive
"Daubert factors" for trial judges to use
in assessing the reliability of a proffered
theory/technique: 1. whether it can be
tested; 2. whether it has been tested; 3.
whether it has been subjected to peer
review and publication; 4. its known or
potential rate of error; and 5. the degree
of its acceptance in the relevant scientific
community. The Court did not indicate
the weight to be given to each or any of
the factors, nor how to proceed when the
factors were equally divided. Subsequent
cases throughout the federal system
have added more information, but the
application of this "test" in specific
circumstances remains uncertain and
inconsistent.
Daubert represents an attempt to
allow admission of more cutting-edge
expert testimony based on theories or
techniques which have not yet been
generally accepted,5 and concludes with
an exhortation to judges and litigants to
trust the system:
In this regard respondent seems to
us to be overly pessimistic about the
capabilities of the jury and of the
adversary system generally. Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are
the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.
509 U.S. at 596.
Implementation of Daubert has not
been easy.6 Nonetheless, it continues to
be the standard by which federal courts
measure the admissibility of expert testi-
mony. FRE 702 since has been amended
in an attempt to digest Daubert into the
rule itself (see below). The Supreme
Court itself has cited Daubert, with
approval, 18 times since it issued the
original opinion. Most recently, in 2016,
it cited Daubert in two separate cases.
In an abortion case, the Court affirmed
a trial court's admission of the opinion
testimony of a university researcher
who tracked the availability of abortion
services in Texas, on the probable effect
of the state's surgical center requirement.
Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt7.
In Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo,8 a Fair
Labor Standards case about overtime
pay, the Court noted (twice) that the
respondent's expert statistical evidence
was correctly admitted, because the
petitioners neither moved for a hearing
under Daubert o exclude the testimony
nor presented contrary evidence of their
own. Thus, it is clear that despite much
criticism of Daubert, it binds federal
judges and lawyers practicing in federal
courts.
States' adoption of Daubert spotty
Although most states (including
Montana) have adopted some version
of the FRE in general, many fewer have
bought into the Daubert standard and
the revised form of FRE 702 which now
reflects Daubert.9 In 2016, Bloomberg
Law published an article entitled "States
Slow to Adopt Daubert Evidence Rule,"0
estimating that nearly a quarter of states
have retained their own expert testimony
standards. Several nationally promi-
nent evidence professors were quoted to
support and explain the premise of the
article, including Georgetown professor
Paul Rothstein:
"Judges do not feel competent
to decide what is good science,
as Daubert commands them to do,"
Rothstein told Bloomberg BNA.
Rothstein said that states may also be
reluctant to switch over to Daubert
because it "hasn't worked out very
well in federal courts."
The criteria Daubert sets out-
testability/testing", peer review, low
error rate, professional standards,
acceptability in the discipline, all
leading to reliability-are "so spongy
that the cases come out all over the
place," he said.
According to the Bloomberg article,
several large states have rejected Daubert
altogether, retaining the Frye2 "gen-
eral acceptance" test: California, New
York, New Jersey, Illinois, Maryland,
Washington and D.C.3 The article
described three other states as "hybrid
... and not easily categorized:" Virginia,
Missouri, Nevada and North Dakota.
Montana belongs on this hybrid list, hav-
ing rejected Frye but not incorporating
Daubert wholesale in its stead.
MRE 702 differs greatly from FRE 702
At the time Montana adopted the
Montana Rules of Evidence in 1977,
MRE 702 was identical to FRE 702." At
that point, the federal courts applied the
Frye "general acceptance" standard to
determine the admissibility of proposed
expert testimony. In the interim, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided in Daubert hat
the adoption of Rule 702 had supplanted
Frye. In its stead, the Supreme Court
outlined five non-exclusive "Daubert
factors" to guide the district courts in
assessing the reliability, and thus ad-
missibility, of expert testimony. Those
factors have been clarified and expand-
ed in hundreds, if not thousands, of
federal cases since. In 2000, FRE 702 was
amended to reflect the holdings of those
cases. The Federal Advisory Committee
noted:
Rule 702 has been amended in
response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993), and to the many cases
applying Daubert, including Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167
(1999). In Daubert he Court charged
trial judges with the responsibility
of acting as gatekeepers to exclude
unreliable expert testimony, and the
Court in Kumho clarified that this
gatekeeper function applies to all
expert testimony, not just testimony
based in science. See also Kumho, 119
S.Ct. at 1178 (citing the Committee
Note to the proposed amendment o
Rule 702, which had been released for
public comment before the date of
the Kumho decision). The amendment
affirms the trial court's role as
gatekeeper and provides some general
standards that the trial court must use
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to assess the reliability and helpfulness
of proffered expert estimony.
The current version of FRE 702,
reflecting the 2000 and 201115 amend-
ments, is:
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert
Witnesses
A witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the
principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
Meanwhile, Montana has not
amended the original version of MRE
702 in any way. Because the FRE have
been amended to reflect the holding of
Daubert and its progeny, the two ver-
sions of Rule 702 now differ significantly.
Montana's 702 states (just as it did when
originally adopted in 1977):
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
The difference between the Montana
and the federal version of Rule 702
reflects a conscious decision by the
Montana Supreme Court to avoid in-
flicting a full-fledged Daubert analysis on
the judges, lawyers, and litigants in most
Montana cases. The current (original)
version of MRE 702 is consistent with
Montana's judicial approach.
Montana rejects Frye and Daubert
The Montana Supreme Court rejects
both the general acceptance test and
wholesale adoption of the Daubert
standard for admissibility of expert
testimony
Background cases:
Like the federal courts, Montana
has struggled with the line between
admissible "good-enough" and non-ad-
missible "junk" science. Like other
states, Montana has struggled with
whether to follow the federal lead in
drawing that line. Ten years before
the Daubert decision did so for federal
courts, the Montana Supreme Court
rejected the Frye general acceptance test
in Barmeyer v. Montana Power:6 "the
general acceptance rule is not in confor-
mity with the spirit of the new rules of
evidence." 657 P.2d at 598. In Barmeyer,
a clearly qualified metallurgical engineer
testified for the defense, using "corrosion
analysis" to controvert the plaintiffs
evidence on the causation of the Pattee
Canyon Fire in Missoula. On appeal,
the plaintiffs argued that this method-
ology was not generally accepted, and
therefore the opinion was inadmissible.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that
this might bar admission under the Frye
standard, but pointed to the courtroom
usefulness of new developments, even
before they achieved general scientific
acceptance, quoting from a 4th Circuit
case17:
"Absolute certainty of result or
unanimity of scientific opinion is
not required for admissibility. 'Every
useful new development must have
its first day in court. And court
records are full of the conflicting
opinions of doctors, engineers, and
accountants, to name just a few of the
legions of expert witnesses.' Unless
an exaggerated popular opinion of
the accuracy of a particular technique
makes its use prejudicial or likely
to mislead the jury, it is better to
admit relevant scientific evidence
in the same manner as other expert
testimony and allow its weight to be
attacked by cross-examination and
refutation."
202 Mont. at 192. The Court affirmed
the admission of the corrosion analysis
testimony, commenting that the plain-
tiffs "searching and adept cross-exam-
ination" was sufficient guarantee that
the jury would understand any problems
with the expert's methodology.
Barmeyer clearly rejected Frye
and opened the door to more liberal
admission of expert testimony, but it
did not offer a specific new test, other
than "not Frye." Ten years later, the U.S.
Supreme Court did lay out an alternative
analysis, in Daubert. Initially, Montana
seemed inclined to adopt Daubert.
State v. Moore" was decided in 1994,
just a year after Daubert. Moore was ac-
cused of deliberate homicide. Part of the
evidence against him stemmed from hu-
man tissue fragments found in his camp-
er. In its opinion, the Montana Supreme
Court noted that Moore was the first case
presented to it in which forensic DNA
analysis evidence had been introduced
in a criminal trial. It also noted that the
U.S. Supreme Court had recently joined
Montana's abandonment of the Frye test
for reliability of the expert's methodol-
ogy, and outlined the "flexible inquiry"
to be performed by a trial judge. Finally,
the Montana Supreme Court recited the
specific Daubert factors, and appeared to
hold that the Daubert test would hence-
forth govern the admissibility of expert
testimony:
The [Supreme] Court emphasized that
the inquiry under Rule 702, F.R.Evid.,
is "a flexible one," and that the focus
is on the principles and methodology
underlying the proffered evidence
rather than the conclusions they
generate. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
113 S.Ct. at 2797. We conclude that
the guidelines set forth in Daubert are
consistent with our previous holding
in Barmeyer concerning the admission
of expert testimony of novel scientific
evidence, and we, therefore,
adopt the Daubert standard for
the admission of scientific expert
testimony. Accordingly, we conclude
that before a trial court admits
scientific expert testimony, there
must be a preliminary showing that
the expert's opinion is premised on
a reliable methodology. We note,
however, that the court must be
flexible in its inquiry. "Not every
error in the application of a particular
methodology should warrant
exclusion. An alleged error in the
application of a reliable methodology
should provide the basis for exclusion
of the opinion only if that error
negates the basis for the reliability of
the principle itself." (Citation omitted;
emphasis added)
268 Mont. at 42.
The Montana Court quickly tem-
pered its original blanket statement
about the application of Daubert to all
scientific expert testimony. First, in a
1996 fingerprinting case, the Court de-
scribed its holding in Moore as adopting
the Daubert standard for "determin-
ing whether to allow expert testimony
concerning novel scientific evidence",
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despite the absence of any such adjective
in Moore. State v. Cline9 . The Court
then clarified its position:
We apply the Daubert standard to this
case because we consider fingerprint
aging20 techniques in this context to
be novel scientific evidence. Certainly
all scientific expert testimony is not
subject to the Daubert standard and
the Daubert est should only be used
to determine the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. (Emphasis added).
275 Mont. at 55. (The district court
had not held a formal Daubert hearing
on the reliability of fingerprint aging, for
the simple reason that Daubert had not
yet been decided at the date of the trial.
However, it did consider the informa-
tion submitted by the defense as to the
alleged unreliability of the technique,
and relied further on the availability of
both cross-examination and contrary
evidence by opposing experts. The
Supreme Court found that the district
court had met its responsibility to ensure
reliability and affirmed the admission of
the testimony.)
Two years after Cline, and only four
years after Moore, Montana cement-
ed the distinction between novel and
non-novel scientific methodology in
Hulse v. State.2 Ms. Hulse petitioned
for reinstatement of her driving license,
arguing inter alia that the HGN (hori-
zontal gaze nystagmus) field sobriety test
was not sufficiently reliable to be admit-
ted under the Daubert standard. The
Supreme Court reiterated that Daubert
applied only to novel scientific evidence,
and held that because HGN was not
novel scientific evidence, Daubert was
not the appropriate test:
Hulse suggests that Daubert is
not limited to the admissibility
of "novel" scientific evidence and
that Barmeyer and Daubert are
inconsistent. We disagree. Accordingly,
we take this opportunity to clarify
our decision in Clark concerning the
admissibility requirements of HGN test
results and to clarify the admissibility
requirements of scientific evidence in
general.
5 56 First, as is clearly stated
in Cline, "all scientific expert
testimony is not subject to
the Daubert standard and
the Daubert est should only be used
to determine the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence."....We
reassert our holding in Cline that
the Daubert test should only be
used to determine the admissibility
of novel scientific evidence.
(Citations omitted; Emphasis added)
1998 MT 108, !5 55-56, 289 Mont.
1, 28. The Court then delineated the
two paths and the liberal admissibility
approach inherent in both:
a trial court, presented with
scientific evidence, novel or not, is
encouraged to liberally construe
the rules of evidence so as to admit
all relevant expert estimony
pursuant to Barmeyer. Certainly, if
a court is presented with an issue
concerning the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence, as was the
case in both Moore and Cline, the
court must apply the guidelines
set forth in Daubert, while
adhering to the principle set forth
in Barmeyer. However, if a court is
presented with an issue concerning
the admissibility of scientific evidence
in general, the court must employ a
conventional analysis under Rule 702,
M.R.Evid., while again adhering to the
principle set forth in Barmeyer.
1998 MT 108, ! 63, 289 Mont. 1, 31.
The Court found that the HGN
methodology itself was not novel because
it had been in use by law enforcement for
several decades and had been admitted
at trial by courts around the country.
Thus, the Court held that no Daubert
analysis was necessary but that a district
court dealing with non-novel expert
testimony "must still conduct a conven-
tional Rule 70222, M.R.Evid., analysis to
determine the admissibility of HGN test
results while adhering to the principle
of Barmeyer." 1998 MT 108, ! 69, 289
Mont. 1, 33. Its final conclusion was that
HGN tests are sufficiently reliable but
that the specific officer who testified to
administering the test and Ms. Hulse's
result lacked sufficient expertise in the
scientific background of the HGN test to
testify. (Even without this evidence, how-
ever, the Court found that the officer had
probable cause to arrest Ms. Hulse and
affirmed the suspension of her license for
refusal to take a breath test. Good try.)
Novel v. non-novel split persists
There has been a steady stream of
cases posing expert testimony/702/
Daubert issues since the early cases
discussed above.23 A 2015 case, McClue
v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois24 , synthesizes
these cases and expresses the current ap-
proach. Justice Baker's opinion elegantly
examined the differences between the
Montana and federal versions of Rule
702 and the reasons for these differences.
She then reaffirmed Montana's twofold
approach to Daubert:
5 21 In contrast to its status in
the federal system, Daubert is not
generally applicable in Montana.
In State v. Moore.... we observed
that Dan bert was consistent with
our previous precedent "concerning
the admission of expert testimony
of novel scientific evidence," and we
adopted Daubert "for the admission of
scientific expert testimony."
We later clarified, however,
that Daubert does not apply to
all expert testimony; instead, it
applies only to "novel scientific
evidence." State v. Cline, (1996);
see Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle
Division, 1998 MT 10 69 (reasoning
that because "the HGN test is not
novel scientific evidence," a district
court "need not employ" Daubert o
determine the admissibility of the
test results).
McClue also reiterated the Court's
preference to admit scientific evidence
on the border of either approach (novel
or non-novel):
! 23 District courts should
"construe liberally the rules of
evidence so as to admit all relevant
expert testimony." Beehler, 5 23
(quoting State v. Damon, 2005 MT
218, $17, 328 Mont. 276, 119 P.3d
1194). Our standard recognizes
that admissible expert evidence
should come in, even if that
evidence may be characterized as
"shaky." The expert's testimony
then is open for attack through "the
traditional and appropriate" methods:
"vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the
burden of proof." Clifford, ! 28
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113
S.Ct. at 2798).
But a question remains
In McClue, the plaintiff alleged that
a motor vehicle accident had caused his
wife's ALS (from which she had died).
The plaintiff listed two (clearly quali-
fied25) neurologists as expert witnesses
to establish the causation link. After
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deposing them, the defense moved to
exclude their testimony. The trial judge
excluded both, and then granted the
defense motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, after making the general
statements quoted above, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that one of
the plaintiffs experts should have been
allowed to give an opinion, although the
other was properly excluded. The key
difference lay in the experts' degrees of
certainty as to their opinions. One neu-
rologist testified in his deposition that
the cause of the victim's ALS was trauma
she sustained during the accident. He
also testified that the cause of ALS is
unknown, which led the trial court to
conclude he was inconsistent and thus
should be excluded. The Supreme Court
held this to be an abuse of discretion:
! 22 The District Court purported to
apply M. R. Evid. 702 in excluding
Dr. Sabow's testimony. Safeco has not
argued that Dr. Sabow's testimony is
based on novel scientific evidence, and
does not suggest that Daubert should
be invoked to determine its
admissibility. Indeed, we have
noted that Daubert is used to assess
whether the expert field is reliable, the
first factor in our expert testimony
jurisprudence. Clifford, !5 29-30.
When the District Court assessed
the reliability of the opinion that Dr.
Sabow offered, it ventured to the
third factor, misinterpreting its role.
Under M. R. Evid. 702, the District
Court needed simply to determine
"whether the expert field is reliable"
and "whether the expert is qualified,"
leaving to the jury "whether the
qualified expert reliably applied the
reliable field to the facts." Harris, 5 36.
2015 MT 222, ! 22.
WHOA, cowpersons! Did you see
the "no Daubert because not novel" but
"Daubert is part of the 702 jurispru-
dence" conundrum above? Here it is
again:
Safeco has not argued that Dr.
Sabow's testimony is based on
novel scientific evidence, and does
not suggest that Daubert should be
invoked to determine its admissibility.
Indeed, we have noted that Daubert is
used to assess whether the expert field
is reliable, the first factor in our expert
testimony jurisprudence. Clifford, !!
29-30.
So: we don't use Danbert because
this is not an issue of novel science, but
we do use Daubert as part of the tradi-
tional Rule 702 analysis which applies to
non-novel science?
Fade to black: Continued next month
Clearly, we need to go on to ex-
plore this further, but it is the summer,
and you have done more than enough
reading. Thus, I will encourage you to
get outside (if it's not too smoky), and
we will resume this inquiry in the next
episode. I will there lay out the Montana
tests for both the very rare novel science
cases where Daubert for sure rules and
the usual non-novel science cases where
Rule 702 applies, but Daubert still may
lurk. Meanwhile, in the river or on the
lake or the mountain, ponder:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to
suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous
fortune [Daubert?],
Or to take arms against a sea of
troubles,
And by opposing end them?
Endnotes
1 Shouldn't we start by deciding on how to
pronounce the name of the plaintiffs, the
Dauberts? Apparently, they themselves use the
French pronunciation, which starts with an "o"
and omits the"t" sound at the end: doh-bayr.
However, during oral argument in the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice mispronounced the
name as daw-bert, and on the fly, plaintiffs'
counsel had to choose whether to correct the
Chief Justice. His choice to"go with it"means
that in most places (and I think this includes
Montana), the Americanized version is used.
See, Michael H. Gottsman,"Admissibility of
Expert Testimony after Daubert,"43 Emory Li.
867,867 (1994); Garner's Dictionary of Legal
Usage (3d ed., 2011), p. 246.
2 I use the term "expert" in this context as short-
hand for Rule 702 opinion testimony based
on specialized knowledge helpful to the jury.
However, as I explained in an earlier column, I
(and more importantly, the ABA) recommend
against the use of the term "expert" by counsel
or the judge before a jury, including in the jury
instructions. See,"Tender is the Night: Should
Your Expert Be?" Montana Lawyer, August
2013.
3 Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46,47, 293
F. 1013,1014 (1923). Maybe we should have
stuck with this test not only for its simplicity,
but for ease in pronunciation.
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5 A frequently given example is allowing Ma-
gellan to testify that the earth is round, despite
the fact that most other geographers believe it
to be flat.
6 WestlawNext (as of July 10, 2018) shows 19,737
federal cases (at all levels) citing Daubert, and
13,970 secondary sources. This article should
boost the total to 13,971. 0
7 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016).
8 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016).
9 Rather than actually surveying all 50 states
myself, I used the ever-helpful interweb.
The most authoritative source I found is the
ABA's Litigation Section "50 State Survey of
Daubert/Frye Applicability" located at http://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/
trialevidence/daubert-frye-survey.html. Note:




11 Prof. Rothstein has combined the first two
factors listed by the Supreme Court into one:
"testability/testing" Above, I chose to keep
them separate only because that is what the
Supreme Court did. Again, this is a flexible
standard. 0 But, if I were in federal court or in
Montana on an issue of novel scientific theory,
I would ask my expert both "Is this theory
testable? Please explain" AND "Has this theory
in fact been tested? When? What were the re-
sults?"
12 293 F. 1013 (D.C, 1923).
13 Disclaimer: I have not independently verified
or updated this list.
14 The Montana Evidence Commission Com-
ment to MRE 702 states:"This rule is identical
to Federal and Uniform Rules (1974) Rule
702. It states the two common-law standards
required before an expert is allowed to give
his opinion, each of which is found in existing
Montana law....The first standard is concerned
with whether or not the subject matter is
that requiring expert testimony. Case law has
construed the phrase'science, art, or trade'to
include any particular area' ... not within the
range of ordinary training or intelligence....'
The second standard is concerned with wheth-
er or not the particular witness is qualified as an
expert to give an opinion in the particular area
of his testimony.This is consistent with Section
93-401-27(9), R.C.M. 1947 [superseded], quoted
above ('... when he is skilled therein'), and with
case law which has allowed an expert to be
qualified in the same terms of the rule, that is
'... qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education ..'"
15 The 2011 amendment was stylistic only.
16 202 Mont. 185,193-194,657 P.2d 594, 594-598
(1983).
17 United States v. Baller (4th Cir.1975), 519 F.2d
463, cert. den. 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 456,46
L.Ed.2d 391.
18 268 Mont. 20,885 P.2d 457.
19 275 Mont. 46,54.
20 The Court commented that fingerprint iden-
tification was not novel, but that determining
the age of a given fingerprint was, necessitat-
ing a Daubert analysis.
21 289 Mont. 1,961 P.2d 75 (1998)
22 The next installment in the Evidence Corner
series will examine the requirements for a"tra-
ditional Rule 702 analysis" in more detail.
23 For example, as of July 10, 2018, WestlawNext
indicates that 98 Montana Supreme Court cas-
es have cited Hulse.
24 2015 MT 222, 380 Mont. 204,354 P.3d 604.
25 Dr. Sabow was a board-certified neurologist,
with over 40 years'experience in neurology
and particular expertise in ALS. He himself
testified that he knew more about the cause
and effect of ALS than probably 90 percent of
neurologists.
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